Optimal Intermediary Rents
研究了金融中介受权益约束的动态经济，发现竞争均衡在权益不足时非有效，社会规划者可通过创造长期租金实现帕累托改进，并可用未来中介活动税实施。
This paper studies a dynamic production economy with financial intermediation. It is assumed that claims held on intermediaries cannot be fully enforced such that intermediation is subject to intermediary equity requirements. It is shown that competitive equilibria are not constrained efficient whenever the aggregate amount of intermediary equity in the economy is low enough to limit production. Specifically, a constrained social planner can achieve a Pareto improvement by creating long-term rents for intermediaries, which immediately reduces intermediary equity requirements. The constrained-efficient allocation can be implemented by a positive tax on future intermediary activity.