Which performs better under trader settings, double auction or uniform price auction?
通过实验比较了可交易许可证制度下双向拍卖与统一价格拍卖在交易者设定中的表现，发现统一价格拍卖效率更高、价格更稳定，而双向拍卖中大量交易是投机或错误。
Abstract A marketable permit system (MPS) has been suggested as a solution to environmental problems. Although the properties of MPSs under non-trader settings, in which each player is exclusively either a seller or a buyer, are well documented, little research has explored how MPSs perform under trader settings, in which each player can be both a seller and a buyer. We institute two auctions of trader settings in MPS experiments: a double auction (DA) and a uniform price auction (UPA). We then evaluate and compare their performances both with each other and with those under non-trader settings. The main results are as follows: DAs under trader settings perform much worse than do DAs under non-trader settings, whereas UPAs perform well, regardless of the trader and non-trader settings. UPAs are more efficient and generate more stable prices than do DAs under trader settings, and a considerable proportion of trades in DAs under trader settings consist of “flips” that could be considered speculation or errors. Thus, UPAs are likely to work better than DAs under trader settings.