Collusion Under Imperfect Monitoring with Asymmetric Firms
研究了产能约束不对称如何影响企业合谋，发现企业可利用公共信息监控合谋协议，均衡路径上可能发生价格战；对称产能有利于合谋，但若价格战足够长，对称产能的最优合谋价格平均低于非对称产能的竞争价格。
Abstract We explore the effects of asymmetries in capacity constraints on collusion where market demand is uncertain and where firms’ sales and prices are private information. We show that all firms can infer when at least one firm's sales are below some firm‐specific ‘trigger level.’ When firms use this public information to monitor the collusive agreement, price wars may occur on the equilibrium path. Symmetry facilitates collusion but, if price wars are sufficiently long, then the optimal collusive prices of symmetric capacity distributions are lower on average than the competitive prices of asymmetric capacity distributions. We draw conclusions for merger policy.