Education: Optimal Choice and Efficient Policy
本文论证了在存在扭曲性工资税的前提下，对教育进行有效补贴是有效率的，无需依赖公平或市场失灵理由，并利用OECD国家数据验证了多数国家实际上在有效补贴高等教育。
Abstract This paper argues that it suffices to assume distortionary wage taxation to prove the efficiency of effective subsidization of education. The paper does not rely on considerations of equity and market failure to justify subsidies. Instead, the optimal subsidy reduces the social cost of distortive wage taxation. The theoretical approach assumes a Mincer‐type earnings function, analyzes corner solutions of optimal schooling choice and derives the result of efficient subsidization in a Ramsey‐type framework. Second‐best policy is confronted with empirical evidence from OECD countries. The majority of countries are shown to subsidize tertiary education in effective terms.