Reassessing marketing boards as hybrid arrangements: evidence from Canadian experiences
从交易成本经济学和产权分配视角，将营销委员会重新解释为混合治理模式，探讨不确定性如何推动这类组织形成，并基于加拿大案例讨论其利弊。
Abstract In this article, we reassess the role of marketing boards and similar arrangements that have played an important role in numerous agro‐food sectors of developed countries over almost a century. Referring to transaction cost economics and to more recent contributions on the allocation of decision and property rights, we interpret these arrangements as hybrid modes of governance. We hypothesize that uncertainty is the leading force pushing toward these organizational solutions and we explore forms of uncertainty at stake and their impact in shaping various types of hybrids. We also explore the role of institutional embeddedness in providing marketing boards and the like their legitimacy. Using numerous examples from Canadian marketing boards, we discuss the benefits and point out flaws of these arrangements. We conclude on the need to assess comparatively the role of these solutions with respect to, for example, a system of bilateral contracts.