Optimal unemployment insurance in a directed search model
研究了在定向搜索模型中，面对总体和个体波动性变化时，最优失业保险水平如何调整，发现最优福利水平与个体风险呈倒U型关系，且偏离最优的福利成本很大。
Abstract Over recent decades, several economies have experienced changes in the level of aggregate and idiosyncratic volatility. This paper investigates the appropriate labor market policy response to such changes. We introduce unemployment benefits financed by a proportional earnings tax within a model of directed search on the job. The optimal benefit level is hump‐shaped as a function of the level of idiosyncratic risk, and the welfare costs of deviating from the optimum are substantial. In contrast, while the optimal generosity of unemployment insurance—which is pro‐cyclical—declines with the amount of aggregate risk, the welfare costs of deviating are small.