Efficient Sovereign Default
证明主权债务危机的关键特征可被解释为生产经济中主权借款人与外国贷款人之间有效的风险分担安排，涉及信息与承诺摩擦，违约和短期债务增加是支持有效配置的必要部分。
In this article, I show that the key aspects of sovereign debt crises can be rationalized as part of the efficient risk-sharing arrangement between a sovereign borrower and foreign lenders in a production economy with informational and commitment frictions. The constrained efficient allocation involves ex post inefficient outcomes that resemble sovereign default episodes in the data and can be implemented with non-contingent defaultable bonds and active maturity management. Defaults and periods of temporary exclusion from international credit markets happen along the equilibrium path and are essential to supporting the efficient allocation. Furthermore, during debt crises, the maturity composition of debt shifts towards short-term debt and the term premium inverts as in the data.