Experimentalism in European Union and global financial governance: interactions, contrasts, and implications
研究了欧盟金融治理的实验主义特征及其与国际货币基金组织、巴塞尔银行监管委员会和国际财务报告准则治理机构的互动，发现实验主义在同样实验主义的全球治理领域为欧盟带来优势，挑战了官僚集权是成功推广利益和影响力的必要条件的传统观点。
Evidence of substantial experimental governance has been found in a variety of areas of European Union (EU) governance. However the relationship between experimentalism in the EU and global governance remains unclear. Is experimentalist governance an advantage or a disadvantage for the EU in its interactions with global regulatory arrangements? This contribution examines the experimentalist character of EU financial governance and its interactions with the International Monetary Fund, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and the International Financial Reporting Standards governance institutions. Our analysis suggests that experimentalism provides advantages for the EU in areas of global governance that are themselves experimentalist. This argument challenges more conventional approaches that view bureaucratically centralized power as always necessary for the successful promotion of interests and attainment of influence at the global level. Since some governance problems require detailed harmonized rule implementation at single points in time, we also find that experimentalist variation occurs temporally as well as across locations or jurisdictions.