Attracting Attention in a Limited Attention World: Exploring the Causes and Consequences of Extreme Positive Earnings Surprises
研究了极端正向盈利意外为何发生及其后果，发现管理层为吸引投资者注意而有意制造意外，分析师也可能因资源有限而忽略信号，最终意外能显著提升机构持股、分析师覆盖和交易量。
We investigate why extreme positive earnings surprises occur and the consequences of these events. We posit that managers know before analysts when extremely good earnings news is developing, but can have incentives to allow the earnings news to surprise the market at the earnings announcement. In particular, managers can use an extreme positive earnings surprise to attract investor attention when they believe their stock is neglected and future performance is expected to be strong. Analysts, who must allocate scarce resources across many firms, can also be inattentive and miss signals that suggest good performance is going to be announced. Using various proxies for extreme positive earnings surprises, management expectations for future performance and desire for attention, and analyst neglect, we find evidence that an extreme positive earnings surprise is a predictable event. These findings are incremental to controlling for a firm’s information environment, earnings volatility, and operating leverage. Finally, we show that extreme positive earnings surprises are a successful method for attracting attention, with significant increases in the number of institutional owners, the number of analysts, and trading volume during the subsequent three years. This paper was accepted by Mary Barth, accounting.