通过视而不见来遏制欺诈

Deterring fraud by looking away

RAND Journal of Economics · 2016
被引 0
人大 AFT50ABS 4

中文导读

研究发现,审计师若随机变换审计方法,可阻止被审计者利用重复接触学会钻空子,从而更有效遏制欺诈;极端情况下,即使审计无成本,拒绝审计反而有利。

Abstract

Individuals being audited potentially learn how to exploit the weaknesses inherent in any audit methodology if they face the same method many times. Hence, an auditor better deters fraud by randomizing her choice of methodology over time, thereby frustrating a would‐be fraudster's ability to learn. In the extreme, an auditor benefits from refusing to audit, even though audits are costless to her.

审计方法随机化欺诈威慑学习效应审计策略