An Open-Access Fishery with Rational Expectations
对比了短视预期与理性预期如何影响开放准入渔业的调整路径，发现理性预期下船队可能在鱼群存量远低于稳态时进入。
How potential entrants to an open-access fishery form their expectations determines the fishery's adjustment path to a steady state but not the steady state values themselves. It is well known that, in the standard model with myopic expectations (those based on current values), boats enter the fishery only when the fish stock is greater than its steady state stock. We show that, with rational expectations (perfect foresight), however, boats may enter when the fish stock is much lower than its steady state value if the boat fleet is sufficiently small. This paper contrasts myopic and rational expectations within a general dynamic model of an open-access fishery.