Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: Policyholder Evidence from the U.K. Annuity Market
利用英国年金数据，发现年金支付时间和遗产条款与死亡率相关，表明存在逆向选择，但年金规模与死亡率无关，说明不同合同维度的选择效应不同。
We use a unique data set of annuities in the United Kingdom to test for adverse selection. We find systematic relationships between ex post mortality and annuity characteristics, such as the timing of payments and the possibility of payments to the annuitant's estate. These patterns are consistent with the presence of asymmetric information. However, we find no evidence of substantive mortality differences by annuity size. These results suggest that the absence of selection on one contract dimension does not preclude its presence on others. This highlights the importance of considering detailed features of insurance contracts when testing theoretical models of asymmetric information.