ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT POLICY UNDER INTERNATIONAL CARBON LEAKAGE
研究两个化石燃料消费国在非合作情况下通过排放税或配额管制温室气体排放时，碳泄漏如何影响政策选择，并解释为何发展中国家倾向用税而发达国家倾向用配额。
This article studies environmental management policy when two fossil‐fuel‐consuming countries noncooperatively regulate greenhouse‐gas emissions through emission taxes or quotas. The presence of carbon leakage caused by fuel‐price changes affects the tax‐quota equivalence. We explore each country's incentive to choose a policy instrument in a two‐stage policy choice game and find subgame‐perfect Nash equilibria. This sheds new light on the questions of which policy instrument is more stringent and of why adopted instruments could be different among countries. In particular, our result suggests a reason why developing countries tend to employ emission taxes whereas developed countries tend to adopt quotas.