Ex post unbalanced tournaments
研究了当参赛者整体实力相当但各有不同优势时，锦标赛会因事后不平衡而激励失效，提出引入平局可能性可解决该问题，并分析了平局最大化激励的条件。
Tournaments create strong incentives under the assumption that the competition between the agents is balanced. If, at the outset, one agent is stronger than the other, the tournament is ex ante unbalanced and incentives break down. Handicaps can in this case restore incentives. In practice, competing agents are often overall equally strong but have different sorts of strengths. Then, competition will typically be unbalanced ex post and incentives break down, but handicaps cannot be used. We show how a simple means, introducing the possibility of a tie, can often resolve the problem. We examine under what conditions incentives are maximized by ties.