Self-Control at Work
研究发现，自我控制问题会改变委托代理理论的逻辑，使企业和员工利益部分一致。通过一年实地实验，发现员工自愿选择惩罚低产出的合同，且临近发薪日时努力增加，表明高能激励或监督可能带来自我控制收益。
Self-control problems change the logic of agency theory by partly aligning the interests of the firm and worker: both now value contracts that elicit future effort. Findings from a year-long field experiment with full-time data entry workers support this idea. First, workers increase output by voluntarily choosing dominated contracts (which penalize low output but give no additional rewards for high output). Second, effort increases closer to (randomly assigned) paydays. Third, the contract and payday effects are strongly correlated within workers, and this correlation grows with experience. We suggest that workplace features such as high-powered incentives or effort monitoring may provide self-control benefits.