Small is Beautiful: Motivational Allocation in the Nonprofit Sector
构建了一个包含营利企业、非营利组织和内生私人捐赠的职业选择一般均衡模型，发现非营利部门资金增加会恶化其动机构成和绩效，并分析了捐赠者、非营利组织自身或政府如何消除低效率均衡。
We build an occupational-choice general-equilibrium model with for-profit firms, non-profit organizations and endogenous private warm-glow donations. Lack of monitoring on the use of funds implies that an increase of funds of the non-profit sector (because of a higher incomein the for-profit sector, a stronger preference for giving, or an inflow of foreign aid) worsens the motivational composition and performance of the non-profit sector. We also analyze the conditions under which donors (through linking donations to the motivational composition of the non-profit sector), non-profits themselves (through peer monitoring), or the government (using a tax-financed public funding of non-profits) can eliminate the low-effectiveness equilibrium. We present supporting case-study evidence from humanitarian emergencies and developing-country NGO sector and humanitarian emergencies.