Competition Over Price and Service Rate When Demand is Stochastic: A Strategic Analysis
分析企业在随机需求下同时选择价格和产能的两阶段博弈，消费者根据价格和服务概率选择厂商，均衡中价格高于边际成本且存在配给或过剩产能。
We consider a two-stage game in which firms simultaneously select prices and capacities. Then, a random number of consumers attends the market and selects a firm to visit. Consumers know all prices and quantities but not the realization of aggregate demand. The probability of being served at any firm depends on its capacity and the mixed strategy chosen by consumers, which equalizes the utility of each firm's price-service pair. We show that there exists at most one equilibrium in which firms choose pure strategies, and characterize the equilibrium. Consumers face a probability of being rationed, firms may have excess inventory, and the price remains above marginal cost. When there are sufficiently many firms, the candidate is shown to be an equilibrium.