Project selection and execution in teams
用机制设计方法研究团队成员如何选择共同项目并付出个人努力，发现信息共享受适应与激励权衡的阻碍，并分析了最优机制的条件和激励偏差。
We use a mechanism‐design approach to study a team whose members select a joint project and exert individual efforts to execute it. Members have private information about the qualities of alternative projects. Information sharing is obstructed by a trade‐off between adaptation and motivation . We determine the conditions under which first‐best project and effort choices are implementable and show that these conditions can become relaxed as the team grows in size. We also characterize the second‐best mechanism and find that it may include a “motivational bias,” that is, a bias in favor of the team's initially preferred project, and higher‐than‐optimal effort by uninformed team members.