Democratic Accountability During Performance Audits Under Pressure: A Recipe for Institutional Hypocrisy?
研究揭示最高审计机构绩效审计中，透明与保密之间的张力如何催生“制度伪善”，表现为行政部门与议会的言行不一，给公民造成虚假的安全感。
Abstract This study shows how the tensions between transparency and secrecy are likely to engender ‘institutional hypocrisy’ in the accountability process taking place during Supreme Audit Institutions’ performance audits. The examination of relations between the French Cour des comptes , Administration and Parliament has revealed gaps between Administration and Parliamentarians’ discourse and action, secrets and things left unsaid. This impression of Administration and Parliamentarians’ full participation in this democratic process may give to citizens a false sense of security leading them to believe that accounts are indeed rendered, which is not actually the case. Rather, the appearances of functional democracy have been preserved.