Early Settlement in European Merger Control
研究了并购方与欧盟委员会就消除反竞争担忧的补救措施达成早期和解的决定因素，发现延迟成本和不确定性（以所需经济分析的复杂性衡量）是关键，且机构资源的影响呈非线性，对高案件负荷下的委员会效率提出疑问。
We analyse the determinants of early settlement between merging parties and the E uropean Commission over remedies that remove concerns of anticompetitive effects. This extends the previously narrow range of econometric literature on early settlement. Consistent with the theory of early settlement, our results confirm the importance of delay costs and of uncertainty, measured by the complexity of the economic analysis required for each merger. We also find a non‐monotonic effect of agency resourcing, which raises questions about the Commission's efficiency in times of high case load. Econometrically, we select a sample of merger decisions in which the E uropean Commission intervened due to concerns of anticompetitive effects, and our selection model provides estimates of the factors determining intervention by the Commission. Conclusions are drawn for public policy.