A Dynamic Theory of Hold-Up
用动态讨价还价与投资模型研究敲竹杠问题，发现当双方足够耐心时未必投资不足，效率损失源于个体理性约束失效而非盈余分享本身。
The holdup problem arises when parties negotiate to divide the surplus generated by their relationship specific investments. We study this problem in a dynamic model of bargaining and investment which, unlike the stylized static model, allows the parties to continue to invest until they agree on the terms of trade. The investment dynamics overturns the conventional wisdom dramatically. First, the holdup problem need not entail underinvestment when the parties are sufficiently patient. Second, inefficiencies can arise unambiguously in some cases, but they are not caused by the sharing of surplus per se but rather by a failure of an individual rationality constraint.