Non-binding agreements in public goods experiments
实验研究了不具约束力的协议对公共品博弈中合作的影响，比较了要求全员完全合作的最优协议与仅要求最低贡献水平的次优协议，发现无惩罚时次优协议更有效，有惩罚时最优协议更有效。
This article presents experimental evidence on the effects of non-binding agreements on co-operation in public goods games. In particular, it compares first-best agreements that require full co-operation by all players and second-best agreements that require only a minimum contribution level rather than full co-operation. The results show that when there is no punishment opportunity, second-best agreements work better than first-best agreements because they are more likely to be formed and kept. First-best agreements form at the beginning of the game, but non-compliant behaviour by some players causes co-operation to collapse. This result is reversed when there is a punishment opportunity. In this case, first-best agreements work better than second-best agreements as they allow groups to establish a common behavioural standard, deter violations, and achieve very high levels of co-operation.