Voting suffrage and the political budget cycle: Evidence from the London Metropolitan Boroughs 1902–1937
研究1902-1937年伦敦都市区在纳税人选举权和普选权两种制度下，政治预算周期的不同表现：纳税人选举权导致选举年减税和行政开支节约，普选权则导致选举年资本支出增加和经常性支出减少。
We study the opportunistic political budget cycle in the London Metropolitan Boroughs between 1902 and 1937 under two different suffrage regimes: taxpayer suffrage (1902-1914) and universal suffrage (1921-1937). We argue and find supporting evidence that the political budget cycle operates differently under the two types of suffrage. Taxpayer suffrage, where the right to vote and the obligation to pay local taxes are linked, encourages demands for retrenchment and the political budget cycle manifests itself in election year tax cuts and savings on administration costs. Universal suffrage, where all adult residents can vote irrespective of their taxpayer status, creates demands for productive public services and the political budget cycle manifests itself in election year hikes in capital spending and a reduction in current spending.