Infant-Industry Protection Reconsidered: The Case of Informational Barriers to Entry
研究在消费者信息不完全的行业中，缺乏声誉使新进入者处于劣势，是否构成暂时保护幼稚产业的理由。模型结合道德风险和逆向选择，发现保护常加剧福利损失。
In industries with imperfect consumer information, the lack of a reputation puts latecomers at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis established firms. We consider whether the existence of such informational barriers to entry provides a valid reason for temporarily protecting infant producers of experience goods and services. Our model incorporates both moral hazard in an individual firm's choice of quality and adverse selection among potential entrants into the industry. We find that infant-industry protection often exacerbates the welfare loss associated with these market imperfections.