Getting Institutions “Right” for Whom? Credit Constraints and the Impact of Property Rights on the Quantity and Composition of Investment
研究产权改革如何通过投资需求和信贷供给影响投资，发现信贷受限的农民会减少可移动资本投资，增加附着资本投资，且产权改革仅对富裕生产者有利。
Abstract Property rights reform is typically hypothesized to boost investment through investment demand and credit supply effects. Yet when the credit supply effect is muted, property rights reform would be expected to induce liquidity‐constrained farms to reduce investment in movable capital even as they increase investment in attached capital. This expectation is corroborated by econometric analysis of panel data from Paraguay. While all farmers experience a positive investment demand effect, liquidity‐constrained producers correspondingly reduce their demand for movable capital. Given an estimated pattern of wealth‐biased liquidity constraints, property rights reform will get institutions “right” for only wealthier producers.