The Debt Trap: Wealth Transfers and Debt‐Equity Choices of Junk‐Grade Firms
研究发现，对于垃圾级企业，高杠杆反而增加债务发行概率，因为股权发行会向债权人转移财富，这不同于投资级企业的标准权衡模型。
Abstract If outstanding debt is risky, issuing equity transfers wealth from equity holders to debt holders. If existing leverage is high and bankruptcy costs are small, this wealth transfer effect outweighs the gains to stockholders from optimizing firm value. Empirically, we find that for investment‐grade firms, higher leverage implies a greater likelihood of issuing equity, as expected in a standard tradeoff model. However, consistent with the impact of wealth transfer effects, for junk‐grade firms, higher leverage implies a greater likelihood of issuing debt. The analysis implies an additional route through which historical shocks determine firms’ financing choices.