Binary Payment Schemes: Moral Hazard and Loss Aversion
将代理人的预期损失厌恶引入道德风险下的委托代理模型，发现最优合同是二元支付方案，即使业绩指标丰富时也是如此，因为增加工资档次会降低代理人预期效用且激励不足。
We modify the principal-agent model with moral hazard by assuming that the agent is expectation-based loss averse according to Kőoszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007). The optimal contract is a binary payment scheme even for a rich performance measure, where standard preferences predict a fully contingent contract. The logic is that, due to the stochastic reference point, increasing the number of different wages reduces the agent's expected utility without providing strong additional incentives. Moreover, for diminutive occurrence probabilities for all signals the agent is rewarded with the fixed bonus if his performance exceeds a certain threshold.