Sovereign risk, credibility and the gold standard: 1870–1913 versus 1925–31
利用1870年代至1930年代伦敦债券市场数据，发现一战前金本位能有效降低主权借款成本，但一战后恢复旧平价不再奏效，市场更看重贬值调整、公共债务和英帝国成员身份。
What determines sovereign risk? We study the London bond market from the 1870s to the 1930s. Our findings support conventional wisdom concerning the low credibility of the interwar gold standard. Before 1914 gold standard adherence effectively signalled credibility and shaved up to 30 basis points from country borrowing spreads. In the 1920s, however, simply resuming prewar gold parities was insufficient to secure benefits. Countries that devalued before resumption were treated more favorably, and markets scrutinized other signals. Public debt and British Empire membership were important determinants of spreads after World War One, but not before.