Is Historical Cost Accounting a Panacea? Market Stress, Incentive Distortions, and Gains Trading
研究会计规则与资本监管的相互作用如何影响金融机构的交易行为，发现金融危机期间较少采用市值确认的保险公司更不愿出售降级资产，转而通过收益交易改善资本状况，从而将冲击传导至其他市场。
ABSTRACT Accounting rules, through their interactions with capital regulations, affect financial institutions’ trading behavior. The insurance industry provides a laboratory to explore these interactions: life insurers have greater flexibility than property and casualty insurers to hold speculative‐grade assets at historical cost, and the degree to which life insurers recognize market values differs across U.S. states. During the financial crisis, insurers facing a lesser degree of market value recognition are less likely to sell downgraded asset‐backed securities. To improve their capital positions, these insurers disproportionately resort to gains trading, selectively selling otherwise unrelated bonds with high unrealized gains, transmitting shocks across markets.