The Efficiency Costs of Dividend Taxation with Managerial Firms
在管理努力有成本的企业代理模型中分析股息税的正向和效率影响，发现投资变化不足以推断股息税的效率成本及企业融资模式，并提出可检验的推论来揭示投资资金来源。
Abstract The paper provides a positive and efficiency analysis of dividend taxation in a corporate agency model with a costly managerial effort. Unlike existing (agency) models, this model is consistent with empirical work in corporate finance and able to predict empirically observed investment responses to dividend taxation. In addition, we show that investment changes are not sufficient to infer, first, the efficiency cost of dividend taxation and, second, the financing regime underlying firms’ investments. We provide a testable implication that allows to empirically uncover the source of investment finance by comparing investment responses to dividend taxes and managerial incentive pay.