Stake size and the power of focal points in coordination games: Experimental evidence
通过对称与非对称协调博弈实验，发现赌注增大时对称博弈中标签显著策略的协调率上升，而非对称博弈中协调率不变且接近混合纳什均衡与level-k模型预测，表明玩家推理模式取决于收益对称性。
We collect data from symmetric and asymmetric coordination games with a focal point and vary the stake size. The data show that in symmetric games coordination on the label-salient strategy increases with stake size. By contrast, in asymmetric games the coordination rates do not vary with stake size and are close to the levels predicted by both the mixed Nash equilibrium and the level-k model used by Crawford et al. (2008). These findings suggest that players' mode of reasoning, and the extent to which it can be explained by team reasoning or a level-k model, crucially depends on the symmetry or asymmetry of the coordination payoffs.