The Rotten-Kid Theorem Meets the Samaritan's Dilemma
将贝克尔坏孩子定理从单期扩展到两期，证明父母利他主义可能导致撒玛利亚人困境式的无效率，并讨论其对家庭内部转移安排和李嘉图等价定理的启示。
A familiar result in the economic theory of the family is Becker's rotten-kid theorem. This theorem states that altruism by a family member will lead other selfish members to act efficiently from the family viewpoint. We extend Becker's one-period model to two periods and show that parental altruism can result in an inefficiency known in other contexts as the Samaritan's dilemma. Implications of this for transfer arrangements within the family and for the Ricardian equivalence theorem are drawn.