Inequality and Political Clientelism: Evidence from South India
研究了政党庇护主义（公共政策偏向执政党成员）在印度地方政府的表现，发现其在四个邦中的两个存在，且受经济不平等强烈影响。
Abstract\n Political parties can be vehicles for economic and social development in poor countries. They can also serve as rent seeking instruments. Uncovering how parties function is therefore key to establishing the preconditions for good governance. The paper discusses when and why clientelism on the basis of party affiliation may arise. Operationally, party-based clientelism is defined as a bias of public policy in favour of members of the governing political party. In a sample of local governments in India, party-based clientelism is shown to exist in two out of four states and to be strongly affected by economic inequality.