Courts and contract enforcement in transition agriculture: theory and evidence from Poland
基于1999年对306名波兰农民的调查，研究法院在转型农业中合同执行的作用，发现仅38.5%的农民相信能通过法院执行合同，且愿意承受重大损失才采取法律行动。理论模型和实证分析表明，合同可执行性和诉讼门槛受成本收益、交易属性及替代执行机制影响。
Abstract The paper investigates theoretically and empirically the role of courts for contract enforcement in transition agriculture. In a survey of 306 Polish farmers conducted in 1999, only 38.5% respondents reported to believe that they could use courts to enforce contracts with their most important customer. Furthermore, those who believed the legal system could be used would accept significant financial losses before taking action. We develop a theoretical model, based on the costs and benefits of court enforcement, which captures the boundary between contracts to be regarded as ‘enforceable’ and ‘not‐enforceable’ and, simultaneously, the threshold of taking legal action. The empirical analysis strongly supports our model: (1) the farmers' responses can be explained by cost‐benefit calculations regarding the use of courts, (2) the legal ‘enforceability’ of contracts depends not only on the efficiency of the legal system but also on the attributes of the transaction, the contracts and the relationship between buyer and seller and (3) the threshold of taking legal action is significantly influenced by indirect costs of court enforcement, such as the disruption of a valuable business relationship, and by the availability of alternative enforcement mechanisms.