Market Power in the Global Economy: The Exhaustion and Protection of Intellectual Property
构建了一个南北模型，分析北方垄断企业全球市场力量的行使条件，发现出口激励决定政策选择与福利效果，南方禁止模仿仅在促进出口时提升全球福利。
We develop a North–South model in which a Northern monopolist can fully exercise its market power globally only if the North practises national exhaustion of intellectual property rights (IPR) and the South prohibits imitation. The firm's export incentive turns out to be a major determinant of equilibrium policy choices and their welfare effects. The North has a stronger preference for international exhaustion if the South forbids imitation, something the South is actually more willing to do under national exhaustion. Shutting down Southern imitation increases global welfare if and only if it is necessary for inducing the firm to export.