How Credible Is the Federal Reserve? A Structural Estimation of Policy Re-Optimizations
提出衡量美联储可信度的新方法，通过估计一个包含偶尔重新优化承诺的宏观经济模型，发现美联储既非完全承诺也非完全相机抉择，并分析了可信度在过去四十年中的作用。
The paper proposes a new measure of the degree of credibility of the Federal Reserve. We estimate a medium-scale macroeconomic model, where the central bank has access to a commitment technology, but where a regime-switching process governs occasional re-optimizations of announced plans. The framework nests the commonly used discretion and commitment cases, while allowing for a continuum of intermediate cases. Our estimates reject both full-commitment and discretion. We instead identify occasional re-optimization episodes both before and during the Great Moderation period. Finally, through counterfactual analyses we assess the role of credibility over the past four decades.