A Game-Theoretic View of the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level
通过将经济描述为博弈，明确建模家庭和政府的市场结构，检验价格水平财政理论的有效性。研究发现存在政府策略使价格仅由财政变量决定，但这些策略比简单预算规则更复杂，且政府预算约束不能仅视为均衡条件。
The goal of this paper is to probe the validity of the fiscal theory of the price level by modeling explicitly the market structure in which households and the governments make their decisions. I describe the economy as a game, and I am thus able to state precisely the consequences of actions that are out of the equilibrium path. I show that there exist government strategies that lead to a version of the fiscal theory, in which the price level is determined by fiscal variables alone. However, these strategies are more complex than the simple budgetary rules usually associated with the fiscal theory, and the government budget constraint cannot be merely viewed as an equilibrium condition.