Bank Panics, Government Guarantees, and the Long‐Run Size of the Financial Sector: Evidence from Free‐Banking America
利用美国自由银行时代的数据，比较1854年印第安纳恐慌（政府担保失败）与1857年恐慌（担保兑现）的长期影响，发现担保失败会显著降低金融深度。
Governments attempt to increase the confidence of financial market participants by making implicit or explicit guarantees of uncertain credibility. Confidence in these guarantees presumably alters the size of the financial sector, but observing the long‐run consequences of failed guarantees is difficult. We look to America's free‐banking era and compare the consequences of a broken guarantee during the Indiana‐centered Panic of 1854 to the Panic of 1857 in which guarantees were honored. Our estimates of a model of endogenous market structure indicate substantial negative long‐run consequences to financial depth when panics cast doubt upon a government's ability to honor its guarantees.