Contractual Dualism, Market Power and Informality
构建了一个搜索理论模型，解释正规与非正规劳动力市场中的合同二元性，内生决定雇主市场力量，并首次将最优最低工资理论置于正规就业成本高、市场力量内生且三种就业状态并存的环境中。
We develop a search‐theoretic model of contractual dualism in formal and informal labour markets. The model (i) provides the micro‐underpinnings for endogenous determination of employer market power in the formal and informal sectors, (ii) offers a unified and coherent set‐up whereby a host of salient features of developing country labour markets can be explained together and (iii) places for the first time the Stiglerian prescription of the optimal (unemployment minimising) minimum wage in the broader context of labour markets where formal job creation is costly, where employer market power is endogenous and where formal employment, informal employment and unemployment coexist.