Voluntary Disclosure and Information Asymmetry: Evidence from the 2005 Securities Offering Reform
研究了2005年美国证券发行改革如何放松披露限制，促使企业在股权发行前增加自愿披露，进而降低信息不对称和股权融资成本。
ABSTRACT In 2005, the Securities and Exchange Commission enacted the Securities Offering Reform (Reform), which relaxes “gun‐jumping” restrictions, thereby allowing firms to more freely disclose information before equity offerings. We examine the effect of the Reform on voluntary disclosure behavior before equity offerings and the associated economic consequences. We find that firms provide significantly more preoffering disclosures after the Reform. Further, we find that these preoffering disclosures are associated with a decrease in information asymmetry and a reduction in the cost of raising equity capital. Our findings not only inform the debate on the market effect of the Reform, but also speak to the literature on the relation between voluntary disclosure and information asymmetry by examining the effect of quasi‐exogenous changes in voluntary disclosure on information asymmetry, and thus a firm's cost of capital.