Sequential Sales as a Test of Adverse Selection in the Market for Slaves
通过分析新奥尔良568名奴隶的首次销售与转售价格，检验买家是否因担心逆向选择而压低转售奴隶价格，结果未发现支持该假说的证据。
When imported slaves were first sold in New Orleans, buyers were unaware of the slaves’ unobservable characteristics. In time, the new owners learned more about their slaves and may have resold the “lemons.” Previous research suggests that buyers anticipated such adverse selection and reduced their bids for these slaves. Consequently, we should observe lower prices for resold slaves. We test this proposition by linking the sequential sales records of 568 slaves. Through a comparison of initial and resale prices, we find little evidence to support the hypothesis that adverse selection lowered the price of resold slaves.