The strange death of number controls in England: paradoxical adventures in higher education market making
分析了英格兰2012/13年引入的‘高分’政策，该政策作为学生名额控制机制仅两年即被取消，揭示了基于质量和价格的高等教育市场实验失败的原因，以及长期市场化对不同类型院校自主性、公平和社会正义的负面影响。
The paper analyses the impact of a higher education (HE) funding mechanism, the ‘High Grades’ policy, introduced as part of a student number control regime in England that was introduced in 2012/13 and withdrawn after only two years. This marked the end of an experiment in market making based on quality and price within a fixed student number cap. The paper analyses the impact of policy in key areas of institutional behaviour, which, taken together, illustrates why the specific HE market mechanism failed, and how longer term marketisation is affecting the different institution types in the sector in ways inimical to autonomy, equity and social justice. The paper concludes that the policy failed due to an overreliance on ideologically driven policy levers that failed to reflect the subtlety and nuance of the English HE market.