CONTRACTING FOR AN INNOVATION UNDER BILATERAL ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION*
研究了信息灵通的创新者与付出努力增加利润的开发者之间的许可合约，发现创新者通过接受更高版税来传递信号，即便这会降低开发者回报份额和激励；版税更易在产权易执行且事前质量证据难获取时使用。
We analyze licensing contracts between informed innovators and developers exerting profit‐increasing effort. Those contracts must simultaneously induce innovators to convey information on the value of their ideas, while inducing developers to exert effort and protecting the innovators' intellectual property rights. We show that the best innovators signal themselves by taking more royalties even if it reduces the developers' share of returns and their incentives. Moreover, royalties are more likely to be used when property rights are easy to enforce and pre‐contractual evidence on innovation quality is hard to produce.