Effects of different cartel policies: evidence from the German power-cable industry
利用德国电力电缆卡特尔的数据，研究了两种法律体制下反垄断政策对企业行为的影响：惩罚卡特尔与豁免卡特尔。发现惩罚未降低价格或利润，但合法化使利润每年至少提高16%，而预期的效率提升并未实现。
We analyze the effects of cartel policies on firm behavior using data from the German power-cable cartel. Antitrust authorities affected the cartel under two different legal regimes: penalizing the cartel in some years, and exempting it for 10 years from the general cartel prohibition. While penalties did not reduce prices or profits, making collusion legal raised profits by at least 16% each year, compared with the time when the illegal cartel was not prosecuted. The threat of penalties was sufficient to reduce profit from collusion. The intended efficiency gains from rationalization, which was the justification for legalizing the cartel, did not materialize.