Incentives, Choice, and Accountability in the Provision of Public Services
构建了一个理论框架，研究公共服务提供中的竞争与激励问题，强调围绕使命组织生产，并探讨分权服务如何通过匹配有动力的员工与偏好使命来提高生产率。
This paper discusses a theoretical framework to study the issues of competition and incentives without relying on the standard profit-orientated "market" model in the context of the debates about public service reform in the UK. It uses the idea that the production of public services coheres around a mission, and discusses how decentralised service provision can raise productivity by matching motivated workers to their preferred missions. Our focus on competition and incentives cuts across traditional debates about public versus private ownership and allows for the possibility of involving private non-profits. We also address concerns about the consequences of allowing more flexibility in mission design and competition on inequality.