Endogenous Local Public Extension Policy
建立了一个竞争性压力集团模型来解释农业推广服务的公共供给，并用美国中西部四个县的县级数据检验。研究发现，农场和非农场压力集团的平均财富和成员规模影响推广人员的时间分配，且农民受教育程度与推广服务供给呈显著负相关，表明二者存在替代关系。
Abstract A model of competitive pressure groups is proposed for explaining public provision of agricultural extension services and tested against county data from four midwestern U.S. states. The allocation of extension staff time is explained by variables representing the average wealth position and membership size of farm and nonfarm pressure groups. Also, farmers' schooling is shown to have a large negative relationship to the provision of county agricultural extension services, which suggests that they are substitutes.