Robustly Coalition-Proof Incentive Mechanisms for Public Good Provision are Voting Mechanisms and Vice Versa: TABLE 1
研究证明，在公共品供给中，若激励相容机制需满足稳健防联盟性和稳健激励相容性，则参与者的贡献只能取决于公共品水平，而该水平只能由支持不同水平的人口比例决定，从而为投票机制提供了理论基础。
We study the relation between mechanism design and voting in public good provision. If incentive mechanisms must satisfy conditions of robust coalition-proofness as well as robust incentive compatibility, the participants' contributions to public good provision can only depend on the level of the public good that is provided and that level can only depend on the population shares of people favouring one level over another. For a public good that comes as a single indivisible unit the outcome depends on whether or not the share of votes in favour of provision exceeds a specified threshold. With more provision levels for the public good, more complicated mechanisms can be used but they still involve the counting of votes rather than any measurement of the participants' willingness to pay. The article thus provides a foundation for the use of voting mechanisms.