Updating the Reserve Price in Common Value Auctions
分析共同价值拍卖中提高保留价的双重效应（阻止边际竞拍者和阻止信息获取），提出一个独立于估值分布的检验统计量，并应用于美国海上石油销售，发现保留价过低。
We consider a common value auction model with bidder participation determined jointly by nature and by bidder optimization. In this framework, an increase in the reserve price as two effects: it deters marginal bidders and it deters bidders from becoming informed. We then derive a test statistic for establishing when it is optimal to raise the reserve price. This statistic is independent of the distribution of valuations. We then apply the analysis to U.S. offshore oil sales and find evidence that the reserve price is dramatically too low.