Wage Bargaining, Labor Turnover, and the Business Cycle: A Model with Asymmetric Information
构建了一个雇主与雇员互不知晓对方保留工资的工资谈判模型，解释了单方面工资设定和低效劳动力流动，并说明总需求冲击如何导致辞职顺周期、解雇逆周期，无需假设名义工资刚性或长期合同。
This paper presents a wage-bargaining model in which the employer and employee are each uncertain about the other's reservation wage. Under specified circumstances, the model's equilibrium is shown to involve unilateral wage setting and inefficient labor turnover. In addition, aggregate demand shocks affect the equilibrium in a way that produces procyclical quits and countercyclical layoffs. These results are obtained without resorting to assumptions of nominal wage rigidity, long-term contracting, or aggregate price misperceptions.