DIRECTED SEARCH AND THE BERTRAND PARADOX
研究了一个包含一般产能约束、拥堵效应和基于事后需求定价的定向搜索寡头竞争模型，发现只要存在这些因素之一，伯特兰悖论就不成立，产能约束只是其中一种特例。
I study a directed search model of oligopolistic competition, extended to incorporate general capacity constraints, congestion effects, and pricing based on ex post demand. In the presence of any one of these ingredients, the Bertrand paradox fails to hold. Hence, despite the emphasis that has been placed by the literature on sellers' capacity constraints as a resolution to the paradox, the existence of such constraints is only a subcase of a general class of environments where the paradox fails. Specifically, Bertrand's paradox will not arise whenever the buyers' expected utility from visiting a seller is decreasing in that seller's realized demand.